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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel feedback-based control technique that tackles distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
in four consecutive phases. While protection routers close to the server control inbound traﬃc rate and keeps the server
alive (phase 1), the server negotiate with upstream routers close to traﬃc sources to install leaky-buckets for its IP
address. The negotiation continues until a defense router on each traﬃc link accepts the request (phase 2). Next, the
server through a feedback-control process adjusts size of leaky-buckets until inbound traﬃc locates in a desired range
(phase 3). Then through a ﬁngerprint test, the server detects which port interfaces of defense routers purely carry
good traﬃc and subsequently asks corresponding defense routers to remove the leaky-bucket limitations for those port
interfaces. Additionally, the server amends size of leaky-buckets for the defense routers proportional to amount of good
traﬃc that each one carries (phase 4). Simulation-based results shows that our technique eﬀectively, defenses a victim
server against various DDoS attacks such that in most cases more than 90% of good inbound traﬃc reaches the server
while the DDoS attack has been controlled as well.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
DDoS attack is a distributed challenge such that bogus packets arrive to the victim from several (e.g.,
thousands or hundreds of thousands) distributed points in the Internet (i.e., attack: many to one). Conse-
quently, DDoS attack needs a distributed solution which several nodes should cooperate to tackle a DDoS
attack (i.e., defense: many to many). Distinguishing DDoS packets from legitimate packets is more accurate
when done near the victim server or at the victim server. In most DDoS attacks, the victim server can easily
detects DDoS packets as these packets have invalid and bogus payload. On the other hand, the best place
to parry the attack is the nodes close to traﬃc sources because (1) by installing a simple leaky-bucket and
adjusting the size of leaky-buckets the large volume of traﬃc is controlled (2) as at nodes close to traﬃc
sources legitimate traﬃc is more probable to not be mixed with the attack traﬃc on the same port inter-
faces of the routers, less number of nodes need ﬁltering action which it is a high-cost action (3) as any
defense node experiences a small part of traﬃc, the overhead on nodes (from both computation resources
and memory point of views) is low. In fact, the closer to the victim server, the worse to tackle DDoS attacks.
One of the main challenges for cooperative techniques is how to ﬁnd location of attackers and then rate-
limit traﬃc at points close to the source of attacks. To achieve this goal, various IP traceback techniques
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based on packet marking (PPM techniques) [1, 2, 3] have been proposed to ﬁnd location of attackers. These
techniques assume that all routers in the Internet mark packets (either probabilistically or deterministically).
Hence, a victim server can construct attack paths by collecting signiﬁcant number of packets. The main
challenges of these techniques are: (1) Universal deployment: these techniques need a universal deployment
in the Internet to be eﬀective, because all routers in the Internet should mark packets. (2) Scalability: these
techniques severely suﬀer from scalability. Reference [4] shows that the best traceback scheme proposed can
only eﬀectively trace fewer than 100 attackers. (3) Cost: all routers in the Internet are involved in deploying
these techniques. (4) Survivability of the victim server: all these techniques assume that the victim server
can survive during constructing the attack tree which takes few minutes; however, this is not true assumption
in realistic.
There are also some other cooperative techniques that are not based on traceback mechanisms. Mahajan
et al. [5] studied recursive pushback of max-min fair rate limits, starting from the congested routers toward
upstream routers. The most serious challenge with this technique is that legitimate traﬃc is severely pun-
ished as resource sharing is started at points close to the victim server and then recursively pushback to
upstream routers. Other secondary challenges with this technique are cost, overhead to routers, no solving
mechanism to protect traﬃc of innocent hosts that share the same paths with the attackers. Yau et al. [6]
viewed DDoS attacks as a resource management problem and proposed to distribute bottleneck resource as
max-min fashion between level-k routers. K-MaxMin is the improved version of PushBack technique and it
could solve some challenges of the PushBack technique. However, there are still some challenges with K-
MaxMin. For instance, K-MaxMin is beaten by a meek attack where attackers send traﬃc rate at the range
of legitimate users. K-MaxMin also is beaten by incremental-step attack where attackers incrementally add
new zombie machines to the attack process. K-MaxMin also similar to PushBack has no mechanism to pro-
tect traﬃc of innocent hosts that share same path with the attacks. K-MaxMin also assume that all routers
of level k (the routers which are K hops away upstream from the victim server) accept to cooperate; but it
couldn’t be a true assumption.
DefCOM [7] is another cooperative technique that makes an overlay between those routers that par-
ticipate to detect and stop DDoS attacks. DefCOM installs classiﬁer ﬁlters on nodes near traﬃc sources to
distinguish attack packets from legitimate packets and asks other overlay node to rate-limit traﬃc. D-WARD
technology [8] is used as classifer nodes in DefCOM. However, D-WARD is a very high expensive tech-
nique that burden large overheads to routers which we believe most routers reject to install ﬁrewalls such as
D-WARD.
This paper proposes a novel cooperative technique that is based on a feedback-control strategy. Our
scheme tackles DDoS attacks in four consecutive phases namely: control phase, negotiation phase, sta-
bilization phase and processing phase (this is why it is called the four-step technique). This technique
overcomes all challenges that we enumerated above. The preferences of the our scheme over previous tech-
niques are as follows. (1) It does not require universal deployment; it can be implemented in the todays
Internet infrastructure; it is important to know that IP traceback techniques such as PPM techniques are not
practical in today’s Internet. (2) Unlike PPM techniques, it does not have scalability problem. (3) Unlike
PPM techniques, in the four-step architecture, the victim server survives because a protection layer protects
the victim server from downing. However, in PPM techniques we cannot have such layer because with this
layer the construction of attack trees may take several hours. (4) Unlike the Pushback technique which has
the high cost, the cost of our techniuqe is low because only routers of protection and defense layers install
leaky-bucket for IP address of the victim server. (5) Unlike the Pushback mechanism that traﬃc of legitimate
users severely punished, in the four-step architecture we do the best-eﬀort to reach traﬃc of legitimate users
without rate-limit to the victim server. (6) Unlike the K-MaxMin technique, the four-step techniuqe fairly
adjusts size of leaky-buckets for defense routers proportional to the amount of good traﬃc that each one
carries. (7) Our techniuqe more eﬀectively protects legitimate traﬃc from rate-limiting than K-MaxMin.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the models. Section 3 discusses the
architecture of the four-step technique. Section 4 evaluates the technique through simulation and ﬁnally,
Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2. Models
System model: The total workload that a server desires to receive at a time denotes by L, while the total
traﬃc received at the server at a time is denoted by f . During attack, we desire the victim server receives
workload in a range close to the desirable rate, i.e., L − d ≤ f ≤ L + d, where d is a small constant (e.g., 5%
of L). The parameter d also is called tolerance parameter which means that the server can tolerate even if it
receives d loads beyond L.
Network model: The network is modeled as a directed graph where nodes represent either routers or
hosts (traﬃc sources and servers) and edges represent the links between nodes.
Routers: Any router has several input port interfaces that receives traﬃc from them. Any port interface
is labeled with a local unique number that indentiﬁes the port interface. We call this number the port interface
identiﬁer (PID). For more precisely, if a port interface is connected to multiple nodes (e.g., routers or hosts)
via a broadcast link-layer channel (such as in a LAN or a hub), then the router assigns virtual PIDs to virtual
port interfaces through MAC addresses. In this paper, we assume all routers are trusted.
3. The architecture of the four-step technique
In the four-step technique, two layers of routers are involved in the defense procedure. While a protection
layer keeps the victim server alive, the victim server starts negotiation with upstream routers close to traﬃc
sources to compose the defense layer. The ﬁngerprint test which is done through defense routers assists the
victim server to have an accurate view about each router of the defense layer and more precisely about each
port interface of a defense router. Then the victim server knows the leaky-buckets for which port interfaces
should be removed and subsequently which defense routers should remove all leaky-buckets. Additionally,
the victim server is able to how fairly amend size of leaky-buckets for the rest of defense routers proportional
to the good traﬃc that each one carries. Our architecture also is able to save traﬃc of those legitimate users
that share the same port interfaces with attackers. To achieve these goals, the four-step technique acts in
four consecutive phases as follows:
3.1. Control phase
The goal of the control phase is to control the traﬃc rate via upstream routers before it overwhelms the
bandwidth of the victim server. Before discussing this phase, the following notes are important. (1) The
DDoS traﬃc at the victim server does not reach its maximum instantaneously, but it only after a few seconds
[9], because attacker’s machines are located at diﬀerent spots on the globe, implying diﬀerent latencies. (2)
When the rate of bogus packets increases slightly and passes a threshold, a DoS attack can be detected early
by the victim server. The above facts provide an opportunity for the victim server to control the traﬃc rate
via upstream routers, which are called protection routers, before the traﬃc is converged to overwhelm the
victim server’s bandwidth.
Now, let us explain the protection routers and discuss which routers are protection routers. We consider
all edge routers of the ISP that hosts the victim server which include both customer edge routers and inter-
provider edge routers as protection routers except the customer edge router via which the victim server
connects to the ISP. We denote these routers by C in this paper. The number of protection control routers
is denoted by Nc. As all these routers are under the control of a single administrator, the victim server can
easily determine the value of Nc in the pre-attack stage. We assume that during normal conditions, the victim
server has negotiated with its ISP administrator about the task of protection routers and the administrator
has accepted the request of the victim server.
The procedure of the control phase is as follows. The victim server divides L by Nc and then forwards
rc = L/Nc to the protection routers. rc is the desired rate-limit amount for protection routers. When the
protection routers receive this rate-limit amount from the victim server and authenticate the request, they
install a leaky bucket of size of rc for the IP address of the victim server and limit outgoing traﬃc to the
victim server to this rate. Also, the victim server forwards a period value (T ) to the protection routers in
which each protection router must announce the victim server the total traﬃc volume that it has toward the
victim server. The control phase ensures that the victim server is capable of initiating the defense commands,
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because its bandwidth is never saturated. In other words, the traﬃc load at the victim server is light and the
victim server can easily issue control packets and easily receive feedback packets from both defense and
protection routers.
3.2. Negotiation phase
In order to save traﬃc of legitimate users, the victim server should negotiate with upstream routers
close to traﬃc sources to rate-limit traﬃc for it by installing leaky-buckets for its IP address. The closer
defense routers to traﬃc sources are the better performance is achieved. We note that customer edge routers
of diﬀerent ISPs that have traﬃc toward the victim server are farthest routers from the victim server and
closest routers to traﬃc sources; therefore, through a traceback mechanism a request for rate-limiting is sent
to all customer edge routers of diﬀerent ISPs that have traﬃc toward the victim server. In the negotiation
phase, anytime a router rejects to install the leaky-bucket for the victim server, the request is passed to all
downstream neighbor routers of that particular router through which traﬃc for the victim server passes. This
procedure is continued until a router on each traﬃc link accepts to install leaky-bucket for the victim server.
The routers which accept to install leaky-buckets for the victim server are called defense routers.
The traceback procedure is as follows. Suppose all routers know the public key of their neighbor routers
and the customer edge router of the ISP, through which the victim server connects the ISP knows the public
key of the victim server. In order to start the traceback mechanism, the victim server generates a message
which represents the rate-limit request, signs the message with its private key and sends it to the ﬁrst router,
i.e., customer edge router. The router authenticates the message, signs the message with its private key and
sends it to all neighbor nodes. Upon reception of the message by a router, the router ﬁrst authenticates the
message, executes a monitor process aiming at verifying whether traﬃc for the victim server passes through
it. Upon the router detects that the traﬃc for the victim server is passing through it, it signs the message with
its private key and sends it to its neighbor nodes. On the other hand, if the monitor process lasts for a pre-
deﬁned time interval (e.g., 3 seconds) and the router did not detect any packet with the destination address
of victim server during this interval, the router terminates the monitor process and does not broadcast the
message to its neighbor nodes. This process is continued until the message reaches all customer edge routers
of diﬀerent ISPs that have traﬃc toward the victim server.
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Fig. 1: The procedure of traceback during the negotiation phase
An example: Consider the network graph depicted in Figure 1. The victim server S sends the rate-
limit request to router A. Router A broadcasts the message to its neighbor nodes (B, C and D). Router B
detects that no traﬃc passes through it with the destination address of S and thereby does not broadcast the
message to its neighbor nodes. Router C and D detect traﬃc with the destination address of S and each one
broadcasts the message to its neighbor nodes. Similarly router G forwards the message to router L while
router H does not forward the message to router M as it does not observe any traﬃc with the destination
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address of S . Router I also broadcasts the message to routers N and O and similarly router J broadcasts the
message to routers P and Q. As can be seen all customer edge routers that have traﬃc toward S , i.e., L, N,
P and Q receive the message. Now assume that routers L and P accept to install a leaky-bucket for S ; but
routers N and Q reject to do that. Router N signs the rate-limit request with its private key and passes it
to node I. Router I authenticates the packet and accepts to install leaky-bucket for S . Router Q also signs
the rate-limit packet with its private key and passes it to node J. Suppose that node J also rejects to install
leaky-bucket for S ; thereby node J signs the request and passes it to router D. Finally, suppose node D
accepts to install leaky-bucket for S .
Stamp the packets: As can be seen in the example depicted in Figure 1, the traﬃc passing through
routers P and I passes through router D as well. In such cases, the traﬃc of routers I and P must not be
rate-limited again in router D. To achieve this goal, any defense router, such as routers I and P, stamps the
packets that it allows to pass by embedding 16 zero bits in the IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld. On the other hand,
defense routers except customer edge routers do not rate-limit the packets which have valid stamp in their
IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld. For instance, router D does not rate-limit the packets which have 16 zero bits in the
IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld. The IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld is used for fragmentation. However, previous study [1]
shows that only 0.25% of packets need fragmentation. It is possible that attackers forge IP identiﬁcation
ﬁeld and ﬁll out the ﬁeld with zero pattern. Because of this the victim server asks all customer edge routers
that carry traﬃc toward the victim server to check IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld of the destined packets toward it
and if the ﬁeld has non-zero pattern leave it unchanged, but if the ﬁeld has the zero pattern, overwrite it
with a non-zero random pattern. Checking IP identiﬁcation ﬁeld and overwriting it with a random non-zero
pattern is a cheap operation such that we believe and assume that all customer edge routers that have traﬃc
toward the victim server accept to cooperate.
3.3. Stabilization phase
The goal of the stabilization phase is that the victim server regulate size of leaky-buckets at defense
routers such that any defense router sends maximum amount of traﬃc toward the victim server with this
condition that (1) total traﬃc at the server be between L − d and L + d and (2) no traﬃc is dropped at the
protection routers (i.e., we amend rc as well). In this case, in the next phase we can receive maximum amount
of samples (packets) from defense routers and we are sure that all samples have arrived at the server (i.e., no
sample has been dropped at protection routers). The size of a leaky-bucket at defense routers is shown by
rs. To achieve the goal of stabilization phase, the victim server through a feedback-control process amends
size of leaky-buckets as follows.
1. The victim server chooses a small initial value for rs. This amount is randomly selected because in
the next round, the amount of rs is amended appropriately.
2. As discussed above (the control phase), the leaky-bucket size for protection routers is set to L/Nc; i.e.,
rc(1) = rc(2) = ... = rc(Nc) = rc = L/Nc.
3. At the beginning, the victim server selects a small value for T (e.g., T = 2 seconds), the period at
which any protection router must inform the victim server the total amount of traﬃc toward it (after
processing phase, the victim server amends T to a larger value such as 5 seconds).
4. The victim server multicasts the leaky-bucket size of rs to defense routers. The victim server also
forwards the pair of (rc,T ) to protection routers.
5. Any protection router, say protection router i, and defense router when receives the size of the leaky-
buckets, rc(i) and rs, respectively, ﬁrst authenticates it and then installs a leaky-bucket for the IP
address of the victim server.
6. Any protection router announces the victim server total traﬃc volume that it has toward the server
with period of T .
7. If the sum of traﬃc volume reported by protection routers locate between L − d and L + d (i.e.,
L − d ≤ f ≤ L + d), then the victim server is in stabilization phase and we go to step 10. Otherwise,
the victim server amends the size of leaky-buckets for defense routers (rs) as r′s =
rs×L
W(rs)
; where r′s,
rs, w(rs) and L show amended leaky-bucket size for defense routers, the current leaky-bucket size for
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defense routers, the sum of traﬃc volume toward the victim server reported by protection routers and
the desired traﬃc rate at the victim server, respectively.
8. The victim server also amends amount of rc for protection routers appropriately. The value of rc that
has been determined for each protection router in the previous step, might be a) more than the reported
traﬃc volume (wc) in some protection routers, b) equal to traﬃc volume in some protection routers
and c) less than traﬃc volume in some other protection routers. We can measure extra capacity in
each protection router as rc − wc if wc is less than rc. Sum of all extra capacities is considered as
available capacity. In a loop, this available capacity is equally divided among those protection routers
that their wc is bigger than rc. If some available capacity left and no router needs more capacity, it
is divided equally among all protection routers. The loop terminates when available capacity reaches
zero or no more protection routers need extra capacity.
9. The server forwards the new amount of rs to defense routers and forwards rc(i) to router i of protection
routers for i = 0 to i = Nc. Now the algorithm returns to step 5. The algorithm may then continue in
the loop that iteratively adjusts rs to an appropriate value.
10. In this step, the amount of W, total traﬃc volume reported by protection routers, has located between
L − d and L + d; i.e, L − d ≤ W ≤ L + d. In this case, the victim server adjusts the ﬁnal value of rc
for each protection router according to step 10. The victim server also adjusts T to a higher value, say
5 seconds and then forwards new pair of (rc(i),T ) to each protection router. The algorithm returns to
step 5. The algorithm remains in this loop as long as DDoS attack exist.
3.4. Processing phase
The goal of this phase is to precisely isolate good traﬃc from attack traﬃc at each defense router at the
port interface granularity. This phase, itself, includes 3 steps as follow.
Step 1: Identifying which port interfaces of defense routers purely carry good traﬃc
First, we should ﬁnd a simple and cheap mechanism to show that an arrived packet at the victim server
has passed through which defense router. Next, we should ﬁnd another simple and cheap mechanism to
show a packet has been entered a defense router through which port interface. Let us ﬁrst discuss the ﬁrst
issue. The simplest and cheapest technique to understand that a packet comes from which defense router is
that we ask defense routers to append 32 bits of hash of their IP address to the end of the payload of packets
that they allow to pass the leaky-buckets. We note that defense routers do not need to append 32 bits hash of
their IP addresses to dropped packets! They only append 32 bits of hash of their IP addresses to the end of
outgoing packets toward the victim server (output of leaky-buckets). Three important questions arise here:
(1) is this possible, considering the MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) bound? (2) Can attackers cheat
the victim server by appending hash of forged IP addresses to the end of packets? (3) What should we do if
attackers send packets with the size of MTU restriction?
Answering the ﬁrst question: The MTU is the maximum packet size that a router can pass without
fragmenting it. For Ethernet, the MTU size is 1500 bytes. References [1, 10, 11] show that less than 0.25%
of packets need fragmentation. The reference [12] shows that the length of more than 80%, 85% and 90% of
packets in the Internet is less than 1000 bytes, 1200 bytes and 1400 bytes, respectively. Another study [13]
shows that the web request length is 300 bytes with a probability of 0.8 and 1100 bytes with a probability
of 0.2. All the above evidences show that there is enough available space for a defense router to append 32
bits hash of its IP address to the end of the outgoing packets. When a defense router appends 32 bits hash
of its IP address to a packet, we say so the packet has ﬁngerprint of a defense router.
Answering the second question: An attacker cannot cheat the victim server by appending a hash of
forged IP address to the end of a packet because the attacker can always append a hash of forged IP address
to the end of a packet before the defense routers. In fact, defense routers are always the last nodes that
append hash of their IP address to the end of the outgoing packets.
Answering the third question: We should thanks the attackers if they send their packets with the size
of MTU because then their packets can easily be recognized. As discussed above, the size of most of the
requests from the legitimate users is less than MTU. In this case, we can ask defense routers to simply
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drop packets for which their total length is more than (MTU-64 bits). We note that any packet should have
64 bits available space for our mechanism. The ﬁrst 32 bits are used to append the hash of IP address of
the corresponding defense router and the last 32 bits should be empty to show that the appended hash IP
address is the hash IP address of defense routers and not the hash IP address of attackers. An alternative
approach for the packets that have size of more than MTU - 64 bits is as follows. The victim server can
ask defense routers to log ﬁngerprint of those outgoing packets toward it that their size is more than MTU
- 64 bits, and periodically (e.g., every t seconds) send log ﬁles for it. Again, we note that defense routers
do not log ﬁngerprint of dropped packets, they only log ﬁngerprints of those destined packets to the server
that are allowed to pass the routers (output of leaky-buckets). To log ﬁngerprint for a packet, the victim
server asks defense routers log a portion (e.g., 160 bits) of the packet as a ﬁngerprint for that packet. On
the other hand, when the victim server issued the logging command for defense routers, it also starts to log
ﬁngerprints of incoming packets which have a size of more than MTU - 64 bits. The victim server classiﬁes
incoming packets and their ﬁngerprints into two categories: good category and attack category. When the
victim server receives the log ﬁles from the defense routers, for each item of the log ﬁle of each defense
router, it searches the item in both categories of good and attack. When processing all items of the log ﬁle
of a defense router was ﬁnished, the victim server is able to see that which packets come from that defense
router and additionally which packets belong to the good category and which belong to the attack category.
Now let us discuss how to determine which input port interfaces of a defense router carry destined traﬃc
toward the victim server. CAIDA’s (Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis) Skitter study [14]
and another study [15] shows that 98.5% of Internet routers have fewer than 64 working interfaces (including
both physical and virtual ports). Hence, allocating 6 bits to show a port interface identiﬁer (PID) is enough.
There is a ﬁeld (8 bits) in the IP header that is called type of service (TOS); the majority of routers ignore
to check content of this ﬁeld [3]. Consequently, to determine that a packet enters a defense router through
which port interface, the victim server asks defense routers to copy the PID on which receives a packet
through it in the TOS ﬁeld of that packet.
Analyzing the ﬁngerprints (appended to the packets or in log ﬁles) and TOS ﬁeld of packets assists the
victim server to detect which port interfaces of defense routers purely carry good traﬃc. It also assists the
victim server to detect how much good traﬃc a defense router carries. Deﬁnition 1: those port interfaces
which purely carry legitimate traﬃc are called good port interfaces. Those defense routers that all of their
port interfaces are good are called good defense router. Deﬁnition 2: those port interfaces which carry both
legitimate and attack traﬃc are called likely port interfaces and legitimate users along these port interfaces
are called poor users. Additionally, those defense routers that carry both legitimate and attack traﬃc are
called likely defense routers. Deﬁnition 3: those port interfaces that totally carry attack traﬃc are called
unlikely port interfaces and similarly those defense routers that totally carry attack traﬃc are called unlikely
defense routers.
Upon identifying a good defense router, the victim server issues a command to the defense router to
remove leaky-buckets for all port interfaces and pass traﬃc without rate-limit. Then, the victim server asks
likely defense routers to remove leaky-buckets for good port interfaces and pass traﬃc coming from those
port interfaces without rate-limit. Afterward, in order to rectify these changes, the victim server amends
value of rs and rc appropriately as discussedin in Section 3.3.
Step 2: Protect traﬃc of poor users from rate-limiting
The ﬁngerprint test assists the victim server to recognize which packets come from which defense
routers. Hence, the victim server can easily detect poor users and their traﬃc and also it easily detects
which defense routers carry traﬃc of which poor users. To protect traﬃc of poor users from rate-limiting,
the victim server acts as follow. the victim server generates a good traﬃc signature for traﬃc of each poor
user based on the user’s packets’ header parameters and then asks the corresponding likely defense router to
assign the leaky-bucket capacity to the traﬃc which matches this signature and then assign the remaining of
the leaky-bucket capacity (if anything left) to other traﬃc. The signature for traﬃc of a poor user is a pair of
source address and source port. The victim server also informs the defense routers, the port interfaces (PIDs)
on which they receive traﬃc of each poor user through it. This also simpliﬁes the task of defense routers.
The probability that an attacker could randomly generate a packet with a speciﬁc pair of source address and
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source port and then the packet exactly passes the corresponding defense router through the corresponding
port interface is negligible. Moreover, any defense router needs to assign a very small part of its memory to
such signatures because good users are scattered across the globe and any defense router carry traﬃc of a
subset of poor users. For instance, if 500 poor users are along one defense router, that defense router needs
to assign around 3KB of its memory to these signatures.
Step 3: Fairly amending size of leaky-buckets
Equal leaky-bucket capacity for likely defense routers and unlikely defense routers is not fair, because
likely defense routers carry both legitimate and attack traﬃc, while unlikely defense routers, only carry
attack traﬃc. Even some likely defense routers may carry more good traﬃc than other likely defense routers.
In fact, the ﬁngerprint test provides the opportunity for the victim server to detect which defense router
carries which amount of good traﬃc. A likely defense router may need more capacity to pass legitimate
traﬃc. In other words, legitimate traﬃc rate at likely defense routers might be bigger than the leaky-bucket
capacity. While, in unlikely defense routers, the leaky-bucket capacity is consumed only by attack traﬃc.
So, we must fairly amend size of leaky-buckets for defense routers proportional to the amount of good
traﬃc that they carry. Let us discuss how the victim server can fairly amend size of leaky-buckets for
defense routers. Suppose after removing leaky-bucket limitation for good defense routers, the available
bandwidth for the remaining defense router is Bw. We can assign 10% of Bw to unlikely defense routers and
90% of Bw to likely defense routers. 10% of Bw is equally distributed between unlikely defense routers. For
instance, suppose there are n unlikely defense routers; thereby the leaky-bucket capacity for each unlikely
defense router would be Bw/(10 × n). On the other hand, 90% of Bw is divided between likely defense
routers proportional to the amount of good traﬃc that they carry. Suppose total arrival traﬃc from all poor
users isG and assume likely defense router i carries gi good traﬃc. Therefore, the leaky-bucket capacity for
each likely defense router is calculated as rsi =
9×gi
10×G × Bw.
4. Simulation results
To examine system performance of the four-step technique, we conduct experiments using the ns2 sim-
ulator. We construct a global network topology from real traceroute data. The traceroute data set is obtained
from the Internet mapping project at Lumeta [16], the collected data of February 8th 2006. All paths start
from a single router, which is the victim server’s edge router in the simulation. This edge router has a degree
(number of input port interfaces) of six. The resulting graph has a total of 5472 nodes, of which 2006 are
hosts. These hosts have been scattered across 200 distinct customer networks. In our simulation, we assume,
these 2006 hosts access the victim server either as an attacker or a legitimate user. Our analysis show that
the average router’s degree in the graph is 16 (i.e., number of port interfaces) and the lower bound and upper
bound is 1 and 32, respectively. We choose routers 2 hops away from the victim server as edge routers
of the victim server’s ISP. These edge routers are protection routers. Number of protection routers is 10.
The victim server’s link bandwidth is 100 Mbps. We perform experiments for various attack scenarios: dif-
fuse attacks, sparse attacks, meek attacks and incremental step attacks. To examine the performance of the
four-step technique, we replicate experiments with K-MaxMin and compare our scheme with K-MaxMin.
4.1. Diﬀuse attacks
In this experiment, 60% of hosts assume to be legitimate users (i.e., 1203 users) and the remaining 40%
are attackers (i.e., 803 users). Legitimate users and attackers evenly distributed across the network. In this
experiment, legitimate users and attackers send packets to the victim server at a rate from the range [20, 80]
kbps and [200, 800] kbps, respectively. Figure 2.a shows percentage of the bandwidth that has been occupied
by good traﬃc versus time. When there is no attack, on average 60% of the victim server’s bandwidth is
occupied by good traﬃc; while when there is an attack against the victim server, good traﬃc can only
occupy 20% of the bandwidth. When the four-step technique is used for defense, system is stabilized at
time equal to 8 seconds which at this time 70% of good traﬃc is survived; upon stabilization, the ﬁngerprint
and processing phase is started; thereby after elapsing 24 seconds from the beginning of attack, more than
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96% of good traﬃc is survived; i.e., 57.8% of victim server’s bandwidth is occupied by good traﬃc. While,
in the K-MaxMin case, maximum 65% of good traﬃc is survived which can be obtained after elapsing 140
seconds of the beginning of the attack. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, our scheme saves good traﬃc much
better (96% vs. 65%) and very faster (8 seconds vs. 140 seconds) than K-MaxMin approach.
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Fig. 2: Percentage of the bandwidth occupied by good traﬃc during a) diﬀuse attack, b) Sparse attack.
4.2. Sparse attacks
In this experiment also 60% of hosts are legitimate users and 40% of hosts are attackers, but while
legitimate users are evenly distributed across the network, attackers cumulate in few places. It means that
1203 legitimate users are evenly across 200 customer networks but 803 attackers distributed only across 30
customer networks. Legitimate users and attackers send packets towards the victim server from the same
range as previous experiment. Figure 2.b shows percentage of the bandwidth occupied by good traﬃc when
the victim server is under sparse attack. With the four-step technique, 100% of good traﬃc is survived after
elapsing 18 seconds of the beginning of attack, while with K-MaxMin about 93% of good traﬃc is survived
after elapsing 40 seconds of the beginning of attack. As can be seen, both four-step and K-MaxMin are
promising techniques against sparse attacks.
4.3. Meek attacks
Attackers may resort to stealthy techniques to avoid attack detection by sending traﬃc at the range of
legitimate users. In this case, attackers must compromise large number of zombie machines to make such
attack. In this experiment, 30% of hosts assume to be legitimate users and 70% of hosts assume to be
attackers. All users are evenly distributed across the network. Both legitimate users and attackers send
traﬃc at a rate from the range [40, 100] kbps. Figure 3.a shows percentage of the bandwidth occupied by
good traﬃc versus time. As the ﬁgure shows, with our scheme 93% of good traﬃc survives after elapsing 20
seconds of the beginning of attack; while with K-MaxMin only 28% of good traﬃc survives. The interesting
point is that survival ratio of K-MaxMin even is lower than when there is no defense mechanism.
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Fig. 3: Percentage of the bandwidth occupied by good traﬃc during a) meek attack, b) incremental step attack.
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4.4. Incremental step attacks
Sophisticated attackers may attempt degrade performance of the system by incremental step attacks in
which an attacker does not activate all attack machines at once. The attacker ﬁrst activates n machines, then
after elapsing each τ seconds, activates n more machines. The number of activated machines at each time
can be the same or diﬀerent. The frequency of activating new machines can be fast or slow. The plausible
problems with these attacks are that they might generate additional control load, from calculating new rate-
limit amount point of view and perhaps increase collateral damage to good traﬃc. Due to page limit we only
discuss an incremental step attack with one frequency rate (every 10 seconds 5 new zombie machines are
activated). Legitimate users send traﬃc at a rate from the range [35, 115] kbps and attackers send traﬃc at a
rate from the range [400, 1200] kbps. Figure 3.b shows percentage of the bandwidth occupied by good traﬃc
during this incremental step attack. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, performance of the system with K-MaxMin
signiﬁcantly decreases with this attack. Interestingly, at time 130 onward, no defense system has the same
performance as K-MaxMin has. The four-step technique is much better than K-MaxMin encountering this
sophisticated attack; though its performance is slightly decreased. In fact, incremental step attacks are more
danger against rate-limit approaches that have been proposed for controlling DDoS attacks.
5. Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel and systematic cooperative defense mechanism based on cooperation of the
victim server with two types of upstream routers: (1) edge routers of its ISP (i.e., protection routers) and (2)
routers close to traﬃc sources (i.e., defense routers). The four-step technique tackles DDoS attacks in four
consecutive phases which are called control phase, negotiation phase, stabilization phase and processing
phase, respectively. The performance of our scheme is evaluated for four attack models using simulation
and also it is compared with K-MaxMin. The results show that the four-step technique is signiﬁcantly better
than K-MaxMin and it can eﬀectively protect a victim server from DDoS attacks.
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